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ADOPTED SPEECH: SUMMUMS IMPLICATIONS ON 
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED, STUDENT SPEECH 
INTRODUCTION 
Few places exist where freedom of expression is more 
important than in public universities. Indeed, "[e]ducation is 
all about speech in its various facets. Schools are intrinsically 
expressive institutions. Their core functions involve choices 
about speech, judgments evaluating speech, limitations 
restricting speech, and mandates reqmrmg speech."' 
Consequently, American public universities have become 
bastions of free thought and expression where the government 
goes even so far as to subsidize many students' free expression 
through moneys spent printing student newspapers, furnishing 
student studios, or maintaining student radio licenses. 
However, the expansive freedoms generally guaranteed to 
students of public colleges may have recently come under 
attack from a very unlikely source. 
In Pleasant Grove v. Summum,2 the United States Supreme 
Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision3 using the relatively 
new government speech doctrine.4 This doctrine essentially 
allows the government to express (or not to express) whatever 
it wishes without restriction. However, the Court diverged from 
its prior decisions when, instead of requiring the government to 
be the impetus behind its speech, it allowed the government to 
adopt private speech and make it its own to the exclusion of 
others. This new take on the government speech doctrine looms 
threateningly over its untested application to student speech-
1. Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing 
Order out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 728 (2009). 
2. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
3. Summum v. Pleasant Grove, 499 F.3d 1170 (lOth Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 
1125 (2009). 
4. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to the 
government speech doctrine as "newly minted"). 
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particularly government-sponsored, student speech-
jurisprudence. If, under Summum, public universities can 
adopt government-sponsored, student speech as their own, 
there is effectively no restriction as to what university 
administrators can censor within that domain. In addition, if 
universities are given complete discretion to determine what 
they will or will not censor, what is to restrict them from 
censoring more than is beneficial to both students and society 
as a whole? The aim of this Comment is to demonstrate that 
the new government speech doctrine elucidated in Summum 
may pose a significant threat to government-sponsored, 
student speech by allowing college administrators to adopt 
student expression and then control and even censor 
"curricular speech" based on viewpoint. In addition, it will 
show that the regime created by Summum also creates 
perverse incentives that will encourage university 
administrators to censor more rather than less. 
This Comment will illustrate how Summum's new take on 
the government speech doctrine may threaten student speech 
by first explaining the significant role that public universities 
play in American society, as well as the importance of free 
speech within those universities. Next, this Comment will 
survey the different standards under which student speech is 
either protected or restricted in public institutions of higher 
learning, stressing the significance of government-sponsored, 
student speech. Then, it will explore the Summum decision, 
denonstrating its divergence from former government speech 
decisions. Finally, this Comment will discuss the implications 
of this new doctrine on student speech in the public 
universities, particularly how it may lead to an increase in 
regulation and censorship of government-sponsored student 
speech. 
I. THE MISSION OF PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES: EDUCATION 
THROUGH EXPOSURE 
The earliest of American colonists recognized the 
importance of higher education in their community. In fact, it 
was not long after they "had builded [sic] [their] houses, 
provided necessaries for [their] liveli-hood [sic], rear'd [sic] 
convenient places for Gods [sic] worship, and settled the Civill 
[sic] Government" that they looked "to advance Learning and 
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perpetuate it to posterity."5 Consequently, the settlers 
established universities to prepare students "of refinement and 
culture, those destined to positions of responsibility and 
leadership in society."6 Notably, these schools were very unlike 
their European predecessors-they were not established "by 
independent groups of faculty and students or by royal 
initiative" for the benefit of the sovereign or the rich.7 These 
schools were founded "by private and public communities, and 
they were meant to serve important civic purposes."8 According 
to Harvard's first president, colleges serve to elevate society, 
for without them, 
[t]he ruling class would [be] subjected to mechanics, cobblers, 
and tailors; the gentry would [be] overwhelmed by lewd 
fellows of the baser sort, the sewage of Rome, the dregs [of 
society] which judgeth much from emotion, little from 
truth .... [N]or would we have rights, honors, or magisterial 
ordinance worthy of preservation, but plebiscites, appeals to 
base passions, and revolutionary rumblings[.] 9 
Indeed, these schools operated with the goal of "raising men 
up that will be useful in [their] learned professions." 10 
Today's public universities continue to further the colonial 
goal of improving communities by educating students who will 
contribute to society. 11 These universities view freedom of 
5. 1 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 6 (Richard 
Hofstadter & Wilson Smith, eds., 1961). 
6. CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A HISTORY 104 (2d 
ed., Palgrave MacMillan 2006). 
7. HAROLD T. SHAPIRO, A LARGER SENSE OF PURPOSE; HIGHER EDUCATION AND 
SOCIETY 15 (Princeton University Press 2005). 
8. Id. 
9. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 250 (Harvard 
University Press 1935). 
10. THOMAS J. WERTENBAKER, PRINCETON 1746-1896, at 19 (Princeton University 
Press 1946). 
11. See Arizona State University Mission Statement, available at 
http://www.asu.edu/aad!catalogs/general/gen-info.html ("Its mission is to provide 
outstanding programs in instruction, research, and creative activity, to promote and 
support economic development, and to provide service appropriate for the nation, the 
state of Arizona, and the state's major metropolitan area."); University of Utah Mission 
Statement, available at http://www.admin.utah.edu/president/mission.html ("The 
mission of the University of Utah is to serve the people of Utah and the world through 
the discovery, creation and application of knowledge; through the dissemination of 
knowledge by teaching, publication, artistic presentation and technology transfer; and 
through community engagement."); George Mason University Mission Statement, 
available at http://www2.gmu.edu/resources/visitors/vision/mission.html ("Educate the 
new generation of leaders for the 21st century men and women capable of shaping a 
410 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2010 
thought and speech as a necessary element for educating 
students to become good citizens. 12 As Harold T. Shapiro, 
former president of Princeton University and the University of 
Michigan noted, 
[t]he special freedoms and privileges enjoyed by university 
communities, whether public or private, must be seen as 
mechanisms to enable universities to meet their 
responsibilities more effectively and equitably. The 
intellectual and educational autonomy granted the 
university ... [is] hardly [an] ancient right[] or rite[], but 
rather [an] instrument[] through which the university can 
more effectively pursue its public purpose. 13 
Allowing students free exposure to a multitude of thoughts, 
as well as the freedom to express their own, is currently 
recognized as one of the primary means by which universities 
meet their societal goals. 14 
The Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of a 
student's freedom of expression and thought in public 
universities, and has labored to preserve those freedoms. 
According to the Court, public universities are a "marketplace 
of ideas" 15 where the quality of education is directly related to 
global community with vision, justice, and clarity"). 
12. See George Mason University Mission Statement, available at 
http://www2.gmu.edu/resources/visitors/vision/mission.html ("Encourage freedom of 
thought, speech, and inquiry in a tolerant, respectful academic setting that values 
diversity."); University of Oregon Mission Statement, 
http://www.uoregon.edu/-uosenate/UOmissionstatement.html ("the conviction that 
freedom of thought and expression is the bedrock principle on which university activity 
is based."); California State University-Fullerton Mission Statement, available at 
http://www.fullerton.edu/aboutcsuf/mission.asp ("To ensure the preeminence of 
learning, we will: [i]ntegrate teaching, scholarly and creative activities, and the 
exchange of ideas, [as well as] [a]ffirm the university's commitment to freedom of 
thought, inquiry and speech"). 
13. SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 13. 
14. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) ("We have recognized that the 
university is a traditional sphere of free expression ... fundamental to the functioning 
of our society"). 
15. Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The 
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon 
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers 
truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative 
selection."') (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. :362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
1943)). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267~68 n. 5 (1981) ("The college 
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."'). Bd. 
of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231 (2000) ("[R]ecognition must be given as 
well to the important and substantial purposes of the University, which seeks to 
facilitate a wide range of speech"). Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
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the atmosphere of "speculation, experiment[,] and creation." 16 
Consequently, 
the precedents of [the Supreme Court] leave no room for the 
view that, because of [an] acknowledged need for order, First 
Amendment protections should apply with less force on 
college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the 
contrary, '[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms 
is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools.' The college classroom with its surrounding environs 
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' and [the Court] breaks 
no new constitutional ground in [defending] this Nation's 
dedication to safeguarding academic freedom. 17 
Indeed, because "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American Schools," 18 courts have extended varying First 
Amendment protections to the different forms of student 
speech at public universities. 
II. FORMS OF STUDENT SPEECH AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 
Student speech at public universities is generally divisible 
into two categories. The first of those categories is pure student 
speech-which is regulated along the same standards as speech 
outside of institutions of higher learning. The second category, 
government-sponsored, student speech, is student speech that 
is aided by the public school through contributions, grants, 
scholarships, or other forms of aid. Government-sponsored, 
student speech plays a critical role in public universities, 
enriching education by making available to students resources 
and opportunities that would normally only be present in their 
future careers. Because of the role of the government in 
sponsoring this form of speech, as well as the role of the 
university in using government resources to instruct students, 
515 U.S. 819, 8:16 (1995) (observing that "[t]he quality and creative power of student 
intellectual" curiosity "remains a vital measure of a school's influence and attainment" 
and that limiting that curiosity "risks the suppression of free speech and creative 
inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation's intellectual life, its college and 
university campuses"). 
16. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, :312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 2:l4, 26:3 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
17. Healy v. James, 40H U.S. 169, 180~81 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, :364 
U.S. 479, 487 (1960) and Keyshian, :385 U.S. at 603). 
18. Shelton, 864 U.S. at 487. 
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government-sponsored speech is regulated under different 
rules than pure student speech. 
Moreover, because of these different rules, Summum's new 
government speech doctrine may affect government-sponsored, 
student speech. Therefore, this Part will give a brief overview 
of pure student speech, explaining the lengths to which the 
Constitution allows universities to restrict it in order to give 
context for student speech in general. Then, this Part will give 
a more developed analysis of government-sponsored speech, 
explaining its protections and the extent to which a public 
university can maintain control over that speech. It will also 
highlight the importance of uninhibited government-sponsored 
speech. 
A. Student Speech 
Within the framework of this Comment, pure student 
speech encompasses any expression made by a student on the 
campus of a public university or college, outside of his or her 
normal curriculum, and without the school's help or funding. 
This type of speech is governed by the rule set forth in Tinker. 19 
In Tinker, students wore black armbands to school in protest of 
the Vietnam War.20 Recognizing the armbands and their 
purpose, the school administration implemented a policy of 
suspending any student who refused to remove his or her 
armband.21 However, the Supreme Court recognized those 
students' actions as "pure speech" and that they were therefore 
fully protected from any abridgement by the First 
Amendment.22 At the same time, the Court did not give 
students free reign over "playground speech." According to the 
Court, the First Amendment still allows school administrators 
to abridge "pure speech" through reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions created to further a significant government 
interest. 23 Therefore, in a school setting, "conduct by [a] 
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason ... 
19. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Healy, 408 
U.S. at 180 (stating that, as in Tinker, "First Amendment rights must always be 
applied 'in light of the special characteristics of the ... environment' in the particular 
case"). 
20. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 508. 
23. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 311 (1974). 
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materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder 
or invasion of the rights of others is ... not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."24 
The Supreme Court applies this same standard, based on 
broad constitutional principles, to cases involving colleges and 
universities.25 In Healy v. James, 26 for example, Central 
Connecticut State College refused to recognize its students' 
efforts to organize a chapter of Students for a Democratic 
Society.27 Without official recognition, this student group could 
not "place announcements regarding meetings, rallies, or other 
activities in the student newspaper, . . . [use the] various 
campus bulletin boards, . . . [or] use campus facilities for 
holding meetings."28 According to the president of this public 
college, his administration denied official recognition to this 
organization, which had been the catalyst of significant 
violence and unrest on other college campuses,29 because it 
maintained a "philosophy [that] was antithetical to the school's 
policies" and rules. 30 While recognizing that refusing to 
officially recognize a group would seriously inhibit its right to 
expression, 31 the Court held that the college could only refuse 
recognition to the student group after demonstrating that its 
refusal was related to a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction. 32 
Essentially, because students do not "shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
[university] gate,"33 universities may not regulate or abridge a 
student's speech a(; the university any more than the 
government can regulate an average citizen's speech anywhere 
else. 
24. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
25. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Papish v. University of Missouri 
Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973). 
26. Healy, 408 U.S. at 169. 
27. ld. at 174. 
28. Id. at 176. 
29. ld. at 170. 
30. ld. at 175. 
31. See id. at 180 ("[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, 
because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply 
with less force on college campuses than in the community at large"). 
:-32. ld. at 192-3. Also note that the Court considers that there is a "heavy burden" 
that rests upon the college to "demonstrate the appropriateness of that action." ld. at 
184. 
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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B. Government-Sponsored Speech 
Because of the essential differences between government-
sponsored, student speech and pure student speech, 
government-sponsored, student speech is regulated under a 
different standard set forth in Hazelwood School District u. 
Kuhlmeier. 34 In Hazelwood, the Hazelwood East High School 
Journalism II class was responsible for the publication of a 
school-funded newspaper. 35 Generally, before publication, the 
class' teacher would submit page proofs of each issue to the 
school principal for approval. 36 In this case, the students had 
written two "objectionable stories," one of them concerned three 
students' experiences with pregnancy and the other "the 
impact of divorce on students at the school."37 The principal 
excluded those stories from publication, feeling that the story 
about pregnancy would embarrass its subjects and was 
inappropriate for the student body, and that thP story about 
divorce did not properly allow the subjects' parents to 
respond. 38 The students responded by filing suit, seeking a 
declaration that the principal's actions violated their First 
Amendment rights. 39 
Although the Supreme Court recognized a student's general 
right to free speech,40 it held that "educators do not offend the 
First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style 
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns."41 According to the Court, 
"[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control over" 
government-sponsored, student speech than pure student 
speech because of their responsibility to "assure that 
participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to 
teach ... and that the views of the individual speaker are not 
erroneously attributed to the school."42 
The facts of this case are crucial to its holding. The setting 
34. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
35. Id. at 262. 
36. Id. at 263. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 264. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 266 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
41. Id. at 278. 
42. Id. at 271. 
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and the speech's sponsor do not only allow for the speech 
regulation, they also provide the boundaries for the governance 
of any public school-sponsored, student speech. Henceforth, 
government-sponsored, student speech regulations are limited 
to speech that is part of the school curriculum43 and that "the 
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school."44 Even more importantly, because the Court continued 
to emphasize the importance of free speech to students, 
Hazelwood prohibits school administrators from regulating 
speech based on content.45 
In spite of the significantly different missions of primary or 
secondary schools46 and colleges or universities,47 courts apply 
the Hazelwood standard to protect and regulate government-
sponsored, student speech in public institutions of higher 
learning.48 For example, in Brown v. Li,49 the Ninth Circuit 
4:3. The Eleventh Circuit has found that the definition of "curricular activity" does 
not require that the activity be mandatory, "earn[ ) grades or credit, occur[ ) during 
regular school hours, or ... require a fee." Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County., 
387 F.:id 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2004). 
44. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. Bannon, 387 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-73) ("[W]hen 'students, parents, and members of 
the public might reasonably perceive [students' expressive activities] to bear the 
imprimatur of the school,' schools may censor student expression so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns"). 
45. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 ("It is only when the decision to censor a 
school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student 
expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so 'directly 
and sharply implicate[d],' as to require judicial intervention to protect students' 
constitutional rights.") (interior citations omitted). Contra C. H. ex rei Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 
F.3d 167, 172--73 Uld Cir. 1999) ("Hazelwood clearly stands for the proposition that 
educators may impose non-viewpoint neutral restrictions on the content of student 
speech in school sponsored expressive activities so long as those restrictions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns .... [T]he requirement of 
viewpoint neutrality, while essential to the analysis of a school's restrictions on 
extracurricular speech ... is simply not applicable to restrictions on the State's own 
speech."), rehi; en bane granted, vacated, 197 F.3d 63 (1999); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 
448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[T]he court in [Hazelwood] did not require that school 
regulation of school-sponsored speech be viewpoint neutral"). 
46. Ed. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 596 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002) 
(holding that "Fourth Amendment rights ... are different in public schools than 
elsewhere" because those schools have a "custodial and tutelary responsibility for 
children"). Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (finding that 
primary and secondary schools are largely concerned with the "inculcation" of "values"). 
47. See supra Part I. See also Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418-19 
(Utah 1986) (stating that since the 1960s, universities have not acted in loco parentis 
for students, nor maintained the custodial role for students that they did m their 
distant past). 
48. Hasty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We hold ... that 
Hazelwood's framework applies to subsidized student newspapers at colleges as well as 
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held that university administrators acted properly in refusing 
to approve a master's student's thesis as it was written. 50 The 
student, Mr. Brown, had insisted on including in his thesis a 
"disacknowledgements"51 section where, instead of showing 
gratitude to a number of individuals, he disrespectfully listed 
persons that he felt had impeded his academic development.52 
Applying the Hazelwood standard,53 the court found that the 
public university in question retained the privilege to "censor" 
Mr. Brown's speech because of its legitimate pedagogical 
interest in teaching him professionalism in scientific research 
and publication.54 
Even while granting government officials the privilege to 
regulate some forms of student expression, Hazelwood confers 
significant protections to government-sponsored, student 
speech that are critical to a college education. Students, 
training to enter "expressive" professions, often participate in 
government-sponsored, expressive activities. For example, 
universities very commonly sponsor radio stations55 and 
newspapers56 that are student-operated and publish student-
elementary and secondary schools."); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson. 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 
(lOth Cir. 2004) ("[T]he Hazelwood framework is applicable in a university setting for 
speech that occurs in a classroom as part of a class curriculum."); Bishop v. Arnov, 926 
F.2d 1066, 1017 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying Hazelwood to a university setting to 
determine whether university classrooms could be considered open fora). Hazelwood 
itself failed to answer the question of whether its standard should apply in university 
settings. Hazelwood, 448 U.S. 273 n.7 ("We need not now decide whether the same 
degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities 
at the college and university level"). Judge Evans' vigorous dissent in Hosty v. Carter 
specifically attacks the idea that Hazelwood should be applied in university settings. 
Hasty v. Carter, 412 F. 3d 731, 739~42 (7th Cir. 2005) (Evans, J., dissenting). 
49. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002). 
50. Id. at 955. 
51. Mr. Brown had originally referred to his "disacknowledgement.s" as "special 
Fuck You's." Id. at 943. Even included in its less profane form, his thesis committee 
refused to permit approval of Mr. Brown's thesis while it contained his 
disacknowledgements section. Id. 
52. Id. at 943. 
53. Id. at 949 ("Hazelwood articulates the standard for reviewing a university's 
assessment of a student's academic work"). 
54. Id. at 952. 
55. See, e.g., Edgar Zuniga, Jr., $2500 Added to KUTE Bud{?et, DAILY UTAH 
CHRON., June 18, 2008 available at http://www.dailyutahchronicle.com/news/2-ROO-
added-to-kute-budget-1.341534 (reporting that university discretionary funds were 
going to fund the University of Utah's student-run radio station). 
R6. E.g., Greg Miller, Student Paper Sees Violation in Budget Cut, COLUMBIA 
DAILY TRIB., Feb. 14, 2007 (stating that the Missouri Miner at the University of 
Missouri-Rolla received $39,500 from the university during the 2006~ 7 academic year). 
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created material. In an age where art and journalism thrive on 
First Amendment protections in order to push boundaries and 
enact social change, 57 many public institutions act to maintain 
and respect students' First Amendment rights in order to 
create an experience that is as true to the "real world" as 
possible.5R Therefore, except when used to regulate speech 
based on "legitimate pedagogical concerns," Hazelwood's 
prohibition on content-based speech regulation preserves the 
marketplace of ideas vital to a college education by preserving 
the First Amendment rights of students engaged m 
government-sponsored expression. 
III. GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND THE NEW SUMMUM DOCTRINE 
Quite different from speech in many other contexts, "the 
recently minted government speech doctrine"59 has only been 
around since about the 1980s.60 Generally, the doctrine stands 
for the proposition that the government may use its resources 
to "say" as it pleases,61 without being compelled by private 
57. See Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for 
Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1517 (1996) ("[T]he arts ... have become 
highly politicized. Many academics and artists now see their purpose not as revealing 
truth or beauty, but as achieving social and political transformation." (citing National 
Endowment for the Humanities, National Endowment for the Arts: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Interior Appropriations of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 
940 (1995) (testimony of Lynne V. Cheney, Distinguished Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute))). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("[T]he First 
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance .... The protection given 
speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people"). 
58. See, e.g., KFSM 90.7 FM Mission Statement, 
http://www.csufresno.edu/kfsr/KFSRmission.html. (last visited ..... ) (stating that 
California State University-Fresno's radio station "90.7 KFSR is ... a dynamic, 
educational resource, providing Fresno State students with valuable, real world 
experience in radio and media operations"). University of Houston Student 
Publications Mission Statement, http://www.uh.edu/sp/aboutus/index.html (last visited 
Dec. 11, 2009) (proclaiming that it is the mission of the University of Houston "to foster 
an open and objective environment ... that provides a public forum for viewpoints and 
opinion; to teach that a news medium is a conduit for free speech and the clarification 
of public issues and ideas"). 
59. Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
60. See Edward L. Carter, et a!., "Executing the Powers with Which it is r 
Entrusted':· Justifications, Definitions and Limitations of Government Speech, 14 
COMM. L. & PoL'Y 453, 459 (2009). 
61. Evidently, there are some restrictions to what the government may say. 
Justice Samuel Alito offered two constitutional limits to government speech in 
Summum, where he stated that "government speech must comport with the 
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individuals or groups to "say" or not "say" anything different. 
Although according to Justice Steven's concurrence "the Court's 
opmwn in [Summum] signal[ed] no expansion of that 
doctrine,"62 Summum represents a tremendous expansion of 
the former principle, and consequently poses a threat to 
student speech in public universities. This Part will set up an 
analysis of how Summum's take on government expression 
threatens student speech by first briefly expounding upon the 
government speech doctrine prior to Summum. Then, this Part 
will provide an analysis of how Summum departed from the 
previous standard and significantly expanded the former rule. 
A. Government Speech Prior to Summum 
Pre-Summum, government speech fit conveniently into two 
different categories. Within the first category rests speech 
made "when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties."63 The government speaks within the 
second category when the government itself, or a governmental 
entity, either takes a position on an issue64 or promotes a 
message through its own funds and supervision.65 In either 
case, when the government speaks, it is not "constrained by the 
First Amendment from controlling its own expression."66 
This rule of convenience was created as a consequence of 
democratic expediency.67 The United States of America 
Establishment Clause'' and that "the involvement of public officials in advocacy may be 
limited by law, regulation, or practice." Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 11:>2. In addition, 
according to Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, the government speech doctrine 
does not "give the government free license to communicate offensive or partisan 
messages." Id. at 1139. However, as this Comment stresses. it is not what the 
government cannot express, but that which it may qualify as government speech that 
creates a problematic scenario in the case of government-sponsored student speech. 
G2. Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
G3. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (200G). 
G4. Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 
2004) (referencing Rosenburger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819. 
8:3:3 (1995)) ("Government expression is expression delivered directly through the 
government or indirectly through private intermediaries, and the government is free to 
make subject-matter-based choices"). 
G5. See ,Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 5G0-61 (2005). 
66. Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94. 139 n. 7 
(1973). Joseph Blocher. School Naming Rif.{hts and the First Amendment:s Perfect 
Storm. 9G GEO. L.J. 1, 30 (2007) ("Government speech essentially operates as an 
'exception' to the First Amendment"). 
67. See Keller v. St. Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12-1:3 (1990) ("If every citizen were to 
have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he 
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currently governs over 300 million residents,68 and it can 
hardly act without stepping on somebody's toes. Therefore, 
when the government is the speaker, not only is it permitted to 
make "content-based choices,"69 but 
[i]t is the very business of government to favor and disfavor 
points of view on (in modern times, at least) innumerable 
subjects-which is the main reason we have decided to elect 
those who run the government, rather than save money by 
making posts hereditary. And it makes not a bit of difference, 
insofar as either common sense or the Constitution is 
concerned, whether these officials further their (and, in a 
democracy, our) favored point of view by achieving it directly 
(having government-employed artists paint pictures, for 
example, or government-employed doctors perform abortions); 
or by advocating it officially (establishing an Office of Art 
Appreciation, for example, or an Office of Voluntary 
Population Control); or by giving money to others who achieve 
or advocate it (funding private art classes, for example, or 
Planned Parenthood). 70 
The government simply cannot function without taking 
positions and expressing opinions, and the people cannot 
therefore hold it accountable for its speech in any way other 
than through the ballot box. 71 
Consequently, because "a First Amendment heckler's veto" 
to any position that the government actively takes would 
severely encumber the normal functions of a democratic 
government, the government is permitted to express whatever 
it wishes, however it wishes.72 Nonetheless, it is important to 
disagreed, debate over issues would be limited to those in the private sector, and the 
process of government as we know it radically transformed"). 
68. U.S. Census Bureau, POPClock, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
69. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 83:). 
70. Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998). See Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) ("To hold that the Government unconstitutionally 
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to 
advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals 
necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous Government 
programs constitutionally suspect"). 
71. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southwick, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) 
("When the government speaks ... it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and 
the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials 
later could espouse some different or contrary position"). 
72. ,Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
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once again emphasize that in each situation of government 
expression previously identified, the expression in question 
originated from a government source.73 Because Summum 
changes this detail, its holding threatens the general freedom 
associated with government-sponsored, student speech. 
B. Summum s Expansion of Government Speech 
In 2003, Summum, a religious organization headquartered 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, sent a letter to the mayor of a 
neighboring city requesting permission to erect a stone 
monument inscribed with several of its religious philosophies 
in one of the city's parks.74 Various other monuments already 
resided in the park in question, including a stone Ten 
Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles in 1971.75 According to Summum, since public parks 
"have traditionally been regarded as public forums,"76 and 
because the city had already opened up the forum for the 
placement of other monuments by other organizations, the 
First Amendment required the city to accept its monument.77 
However, as maintained by all nine justices of the Supreme 
Court, the Ten Commandments monument, as well as any 
other monument in that park, constituted government speech 
73. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 574 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006) (finding that when 
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, but are making government 
pronouncements). Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-61 (stating that "from the beginning to 
end," the message in question was directed, implemented, and paid for by the federal 
government). Finley, 524 U.S. at 597-99 (stating that by passing laws that created 
discriminatory standards for the distribution of government subsidies, Congress was 
"speaking"). Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 194 (holding that the government may 
"discriminate[] on the basis of viewpoint" by "choos[ing] to fund a program dedicated to 
advance certain permissible goals"). Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 
275, 284-87 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that the school district's active advocacy of 
pending legislation through its use of the district's website and other information 
distribution channels was government speech and therefore not subject to the First 
Amendment). R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(stating that, under the government speech doctrine, the government may tax specific 
business and use all of the funds raised to vilify those very businesses). Downs v. L.A. 
Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1012 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the school 
district's erection of a bulletin board promoting Gay and Lesbian Awareness in a public 
school was government speech.). 
74. Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129-30 (2009). 
75. Id. at 1129. 
76. Id. at 1130. 
77. Id. 
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and was therefore not subject to the First Amendment. n 
According to the Court, the fact that a private organization 
donated the Ten Commandments monument did not matter; 79 
nor did it matter that the monument itself proclaims to the 
world the identity of its donor organization.8° For the Court, 
the only details of significance were the monument's placement 
on public property, 81 that the use of public property for erecting 
monuments does not normally constitute a public forum, 82 and 
that the city was able to "[take] ownership" of that 
monument83- "'effectively control[ing)' the messages sent by 
the monuments in the park by exercising 'final approval 
authority' over their selection."84 Once the city used its own 
resources for the monument, and then asserted some sort of 
control over it, the city adopted that monument and everything 
that it could represent. 
This holding is strikingly different from former government 
expression jurisprudence, offering one major departure from 
prior decisions. Namely, the government no longer needs to be 
the catalyst or source of government speech. Past cases 
featured the government as either the direct speaker through 
choices or pronouncements made by its officers, or as an 
indirect speaker through the programs that it proactively 
established and funded. 
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley85 is an example 
of government speech where the government acted as a direct 
speaker. The National Endowment for the Arts IS an 
independent federal agency created by the National 
Foundation for the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965.86 This act 
requires the chairperson of this agency "to ensure that 'artistic 
78. Id. at 1138, 1140. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A]ll the Justices agreed that 
government speech was at issue"). 
79. See id. at ll:i4 ("The parks of this country contain thousands of donated 
monuments that government entities have used for their own expressive purposes .... 
Requiring all of these jurisdictions to go back and proclaim formally that they adopt all 
of these monuments as their own expressive vehicles would be a pointless exercise that 
the Constitution does not mandate"). 
80. See id. at 11.35 (referring to the "Imagine" monument in New York City, 
which bears the lyrics to John Lennon's song of the same name). 
81. Id. at 1136. 
82. ld. at 11:17-38. 
83. Id. at 1134. 
84. Id. 
85. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
86. 20 U.S.C.A. § 953 (WEST 2008). 
422 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2010 
excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant] 
applications are judged, taking into consideration general 
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and 
values of the American public.'"87 In Finley, four artists, whose 
applications for federal grants were rejected, sued the agency, 
claiming that the current law permitted the Foundation's 
chairperson to make unconstitutional viewpoint-based 
decisions in awarding federal funds. 88 The Supreme Court, 
however, disagreed. Recognizing that the National Endowment 
for the Arts was a federal institution, the Supreme Court ruled 
it could speak as a federal body by allocating its competitive 
funding according to any form of criteria, discriminatory or 
not. 89 
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association90 is an example 
of the government speaking indirectly through an established 
program. In Johanns, the federal government had levied a tax 
on beef production in order to fund promotional projects 
encouraging beef consumption.91 A non-governmental 
operating committee designed and implemented these 
promotional campaigns, which were directly supervised by the 
Secretary of Agriculture and a Beef Promotion and Research 
Board that the Secretary appointed.92 However, American beef 
producers objected to this program, claiming that "the 
advertising promote[d] beef as a generic commodity, ... 
[therefore] imped[ing] their efforts to promote the superiority 
of, inter alia, American beef, grain-fed beef, or certified Angus 
or Hereford beef."93 Furthermore, they felt that since a non-
governmental agency implemented the beef advertising 
campaign, the government speech doctrine did not make it 
immune to the First Amendment.94 Again, the Supreme Court 
disagreed. According to the Court, even though the government 
used a non-governmental entity to design its promotional 
campaigns, because "[t]he message set out. . . [was] from 
87. Finley, 524 U.S. at 572 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(l)). 
88. ld. at 577-78. 
89. ld. at 599 ("The Government . . . may allocate both competitive and 
noncompetitive funding ad libitum, insofar as the First Amendment is concerned"). 
90. Johanns, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
91. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 554-56. 
92. ld. at 553. 
93. Id. at 556. 
94. ld. at 560. 
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beginning to end the message established by the Federal 
Government," those advertisements were a form of government 
speech where the government spoke indirectly.95 
In Summum, the Supreme Court held that the government 
can adopt expression that is, at its origin, neither directly nor 
indirectly government speech but is explicitly attributed to a 
private party. Normally, one would reasonably infer that the 
Fraternal Order of the Eagles, the civic group that originally 
donated the stone monument at issue in Summum, initiated 
the speech thereon.96 The monument itself bears a prominent 
inscription declaring that the Eagles donated it to the city, and 
the Eagles continue to maintain this monument and ensure 
that its text remains visible.97 Yet, when the City of Pleasant 
Grove accepted the monument and used its resources to 
maintain it as a public display, that monument and everything 
that it could say or represent98 became government speech and 
was therefore not subject to First Amendment restrictions. 99 
The idea that connects Summum's new deviation to the 
Court's past decisions is that the government necessarily exerts 
control over its own speech. 100 When the government expends 
its resources to convey a message and controls the content of 
that message, that speech is attributed to the government, 
regardless of whether any third party conveys the message. 101 
However, Summum goes further in that it permits the 
government to adopt third-party speech conceived and 
developed outside of any government influence when the 
government devotes its resources to the dissemination of that 
expression and exerts some final approval authority over it. 
This new standard becomes problematic when placed in the 
sphere of public education where a significant amount of 
student speech is government-sponsored. 
95. ld. at 561. 
96. Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009). 
97. BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT AT 4, PLEASANT GROVE V. SUMMUM, 129 S. CT. 1125 
(2009) (No. 07-665). 
98. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135 (discussing the fact that a single monument 
may convey multiple messages). 
99. ld. at 1138. 
100. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 
819, 8::33 (1995) ("When the government disburses public funds to private entities to 
convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to 
ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee"). 
101. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 561 (2005). 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SUMMUMS EXPANSION ON STUDENT 
SPEECH 
Summum's expansion of government speech has yet to be 
tested. Nevertheless, when measured against the standards set 
to protect government-sponsored, student speech, its plausible 
effects can be anticipated. Accordingly, this Part will explain 
some of the implications that Summum may have on 
government-sponsored, student speech by first explaining how 
Summum's holding can allow the government to adopt school-
funded, student speech. Then, this Part will describe how 
adverse incentives may encourage public universities to take 
advantage of speech adoption in order to censor government-
sponsored, student speech without penalty. Next, this Part will 
explain how those same perverse incentives will push school 
administrators who already practice censorship through speech 
adoption, to exercise their censoring powers with increasing 
frequency, effectively stifling this form of student speech. 
Finally, despite all the incentives in favor of increased 
censorship, this Part will explore how some universities, may 
still have a very important reason for maintaining free 
expression-maintaining an attractive appearance for future 
students. Consequently, this may act as a counterbalance to 
the negative incentives of speech adoption and help keep public 
universities friendly toward uninhibited government-
sponsored, student speech. Nevertheless, this Part will 
conclude that in spite of any countervailing incentives, 
Summum's speech adoption theory poses a significant threat to 
free student speech. 
A. Adopting Government-Sponsored, Student Speech 
Summum's three-pronged approach feasibly creates a 
means by which college administrators may strictly regulate 
and censor government-sponsored, student speech, insulating 
it from its First Amendment protections by making it pure 
government speech. By its very nature, government-sponsored, 
student speech satisfies Summum's first prong. As previously 
discussed, government-sponsored, student speech is speech 
that the government funds or supports which can reasonably 
bear its imprimatur. 102 The government has thus already 
102. See supra Part II.B. Contra Rust v. Sullivan. 500 U.S. 173, 199 (1991) 
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ostensibly purchased its share of school-sponsored expression, 
and started to lay claim to school-sponsored, student speech by 
diverting resources to its development and dissemination. 
Summum's second prong for adopting private speech, which 
requires that this speech be made in a nonpublic forum, is also 
already satisfied under Hazelwood. In a traditional public 
forum, the government's ability to limit speech is "sharply 
circumscribed." 103 In contrast, the First Amendment permits 
the government to make any restrictions to limit expression 
within a nonpublic forum. 104 While the Hazelwood standard 
guarantees First Amendment protection to government-
sponsored student speech, 105 it nevertheless permits school 
administrators to censor and restrict that speech based on 
legitimate pedagogical concerns. 106 The First Amendment 
allows this restriction because a school's curricular 
requirements place such speech within a nonpublic forum. 107 
Therefore, any speech that can feasibly be regulated under 
Hazelwood occurs in a nonpublic forum and is therefore 
exposed to Summum. 
The government's adoption of subsidized student speech is 
then vested through its satisfaction of Summum's third 
prong-exerc1smg control over that speech. As noted 
previously, the Hazelwood standard prohibits schools from 
engaging in viewpoint discrimination of government-sponsored, 
student speech and only permits censorship for legitimate 
pedagogical concerns. 108 However, if the government may adopt 
speech as its own by exerting control over that expression in 
any manner that it sees fit, then Hazelwood's restriction may 
no longer hold force. Universities could "exert control" by 
simply refusing to continue their support of "free student 
media," allowing less-restricted programs to lapse in favor of 
("[F]unding by the Government, even when coupled with the freedom of the fund 
recipients to speak outside the scope of the Government-funded project, is [not] 
invariably sufficient to justify Government control over the content of expression"). 
103. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). 
104. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) 
("'mplicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in 
access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity''). 
105. See supra Part II. B. 
106. Id. 
107. See Hasty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 736 (2005) ("[I]n Hazelwood, being part of 
the curriculum [was] a sufficient condition of a nonpublic forum.") (emphasis omitted). 
108. See supra Part II. B. 
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newer student programs whose content is more strictly 
monitored. Or, universities could arbitrarily change their 
policies and regulate subsidized speech as they see fit-even 
based on viewpoint-in order to complete their adoption and 
control over that speech. In any case, once a university begins 
to exert control over expression, the university adopts that 
expression and it becomes exempt from First Amendment 
restrictions under the government speech doctrine. 
In Hasty v. Carter, 109 Judge Easterbrook presciently 
describes how such a situation might unravel. In one of the 
three hypotheticals that he proposes, a university offers "course 
credit to journalism students who prepare[] a publishable 
piece" for an alumni magazine. 110 Supposing that the 
university directly managed this publication, all of its contents 
would unquestionably be the university's speech. 111 Although 
an "alumni magazine" is arguably different from a student 
newspaper or a student art exhibition because it was not 
originally conceived as a form of student speech, the concept of 
creating government speech through imposing control is 
apparent and transferrable. The university necessarily controls 
all of the content within the alumni magazine, and it speaks 
through the magazine because of its control. By exerting 
control over that expression, the public university incorporates 
it into the university's curricular requirements and that 
expression loses all constitutional protections. 112 
As another illustration, consider a hypothetical law that 
allows an individual to claim property by simply writing her 
name on it. Once an individual claims property, there are no 
restrictions regarding what she can do with it. At the same 
time, a second hypothetical law protects property by 
prohibiting people from writing on it. However, the second law 
does little to keep an individual from writing on property if at 
the very moment she moves to assert illegal authority over any 
object, she gains the legal authority to do what she wishes with 
109. 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005). 
110. Hasty, 412 F.3d at 736. 
111. Id. 
112. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) 
("When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the 
University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of 
what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to 
convey its own message"). 
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it. Likewise, First Amendment protections to government-
sponsored, student speech will do little good if the government 
can gain immunity from those restrictions by simply breaching 
them. 
B. Speech Adoption May Increase Censorship in Public 
Universities 
Because the government speech doctrine allows a 
government speaker to say or refuse to say anything that it 
wishes, adopting government-sponsored student speech can 
allow school administrators absolute discretion in censoring 
that form of student expression. This possibility presents public 
universities with two important questions: The first question a 
university would need to decide under this regime is whether it 
should take advantage of speech adoption under Summum. The 
second question is, if the university does decide to censor 
school-sponsored, student speech through adoption, how often 
will it use these powers to stifle student expresswn. 
Unfortunately, due to the perverse incentives associated with 
each of these choices, Summum's expansion of the government 
speech doctrine may plausibly lead to the increased censorship 
of government-sponsored speech in public universities. 
First, significant incentives weigh in favor of universities 
exercising their option to censor student speech through 
adoption. Government-sponsored, student expression, which is 
often broadcast to the public through government funds, can be 
a source of public embarrassment for a university. Either 
through its active criticism of university officials, 113 or through 
its distasteful subject matter, 114 government-sponsored, 
student expression may bring negative attention to schools. 
Consequently, many public universities still attempt to bridle 
student speech through unconstitutional restrictions. 115 If 
113. E.g .• Hasty 412 F.3d 7:31 (where students at a university newspaper directly 
attacked the integrity of one of the school's deans). 
114. E.g. Logan Braman, Kinky Cardinals Start Group for Students to Promote 
Safe, Sane, Consensual Sex, BALL STATE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 5, 2009, available at 
http://www. bsu dailynews.com/2 .14295/kinky -cardinals- start-group-for-students- to-
promote-safe-sane-consensual-sex-1.2004934 (interviewing and highlighting a student 
group which promotes deviant sexual behaviors). 
115. Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Spotlight on Speech Codes 
2010: The Stale of Free Speech on Our Nation's Campuses, at 6, available at 
h ttps://www. the fire .org/pu b lic/pdfs/9aed 4643c95e93299724a350234a29d6. pdf (noting 
that of the public universities surveyed in its latest report, 71% of them still 
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Summum's speech adoption doctrine grants public universities 
constitutional authority over school-sponsored, student 
expression, thus allowing them to avoid any of the costs 
associated with that form of expression, it would be foolish for a 
university to repudiate such a power. 
Second, because Summum's government speech doctrine 
requires a form of discretionary prior restraint, public 
universities that adopt Hazelwood speech as government 
expression will be more likely than not to censor speech that 
they find questionable. According to the Supreme Court, one of 
the primary means by which Summum's Ten Commandments 
monument became government speech was the city's exertion 
of control over the edifice. 116 This control, exhibited through 
the city's final approval authority over which monuments are 
permitted in its parks, 117 is a form of prior restraint or a 
"scheme which gives public officials the power to deny use of a 
forum in advance of its actual expression." 118 Scholars and 
jurists alike recognize that prior restraint, a form of speech 
regulation that the Framers deemed to be particularly 
reprehensible, 119 "is so constructed as to make it easier, and 
hence more likely, that in any particular case the government 
will rule adversely to free expression." 120 This is because prior 
restraint regimes shift the burden of any expression's 
consequences from the government to the speaker. 121 For 
example, if a university encounters speech that it finds 
questionable, it has two choices: it can allow the speech and 
then cope with any of the negative consequences that it causes, 
maintained unconstitutional restrictions of student speech). 
116. Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009). 
117. I d. (stating that the exercise of "final approval authority" over the monuments 
allowed in Pleasant Grove's Pioneer Park was an essential reason as to why the Ten 
Commandments monument represented government expression). 
118. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1194 (6th ed. 1990). 
119. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) ("[Prior restraints] strike[] 
at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and 
censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against 
the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his 
assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.' And the liberty of the 
press became initially a right to publish 'without a license what formerly could be 
published only with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication 
cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that 
restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision.") 
120. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEl\!P. 
PROBS. 648, 657 (1955). 
121. Id. 
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or it can simply censor that speech before it is released. Of 
course, instead of choosing to shoulder the burden itself by 
dealing with the consequences of the expression that it has 
permitted, a university censor would use its power to censor 
the speech and thus force the speaker to bear the burden of 
having his expression stifled. 
This type of situation does not appear to be too far-fetched. 
Consider the following hypothetical: Sophisticated public 
university administrators have been having significant 
difficulty with their student-run newspaper. Recent articles 
have been highly critical of the university administration's 
actions and have been creating a large amount of community 
and student discontent. Understanding that they cannot 
simply shut down the newspaper due to a potential §1938 
lawsuit, administrators decide that they will instead give the 
newspaper an "upgrade" after its then-current staff finished its 
term. This upgrade consists of changing the newspaper's 
identity, giving it a new name and reorganizing its structure by 
requiring an administration appointed editor-in-chief. This new 
editor-in-chief is specifically instructed to ensure that the 
newspaper, as one of the university's voices to the community, 
never gives a negative impression of the university or its 
administration by approving all articles before they are 
printed. In this simple hypothetical, the university 
administrators closed the more public forum that existed 
during the newspaper's troubled era, in favor of a semi-public 
forum where they maintained much more control. In addition, 
by placing a supervisor of their choice in control the 
newspaper's content, they have adequately adopted the 
newspaper's speech as their own, placing it beyond the 
boundaries of any First Amendment protections. 
Consequently, because of the nature of Summum's adoption 
doctrine, public universities are confronted with substantial 
incentives to not only seek to adopt government-sponsored, 
student speech in order to censor it, but to also censor more 
often than not while using prior restraints. 
C. External Incentives May Provide a Counterbalance to the 
Tendency to Censor 
In spite of the significant incentives pulling public 
universities toward speech adoption and increased censorship, 
considerable pressures may continue to push schools toward 
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openness in education, and could act as a counterbalance to 
censorship incentives unless some factor were to upset that 
balance. Perhaps the most important of those pressures is the 
desire of some public universities to appear as schools that 
encourage free expression as they seek to attract large and 
diverse student bodies. 
One of the ways in which many universities seek to attract 
those students is through accreditation. As a recent 
development, universities have increasingly become a 
consumer product-like any new pair of shoes or high-
definition television. 122 Consequently, many students, as 
informed consumers, approach their choice of public university 
by weighing the risks and benefits provided by an 
institution. 123 Certainly, price and location are important 
features to consider, but more importantly, students have come 
to value the employability of an institution's graduates. 124 It is 
perhaps for this reason that university ranking systems have 
become such a popular magazine seller. 125 
Many students can measure the employability of any 
college program is through its accreditation. 126 The U.S. 
Department of Education recognizes "select accrediting 
agencies as reliable authorities regarding the quality of 
education or training offered by the institutions or programs 
they accredit."127 Generally, accreditation by a recognized 
122. Francine Rochford, The Contested Product of a University Education, 30 J. 
HIGHER EDUC. POL'Y & MGMT. 41, 43-44 (2008). 
123. Id. at 44. 
124. !d. at 46-4 7. 
125. Samuel G. Freedman, Putting a Curious Eye on a High School Ranking 
System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007 (stating that the U.S. News and World Reports 
College Rankings issues receives significantly higher Internet traffic than any of its 
other content, and even sells 50% more magazines than any of its other issues). 
126. Some professions not only prefer that future employees attend an accredited 
school, but even require it. U.S. Dept. of Education. 
http://www2.ed.gov/students/prep/college/diplomamills/accreditation.html ("Attending 
an accredited institution is often a requirement for employment and can be helpful 
later on if you want to transfer academic credits to another institution"). N.Y.Ct.Rules, 
§ 520.3 (McKinney's 2010) ("An applicant may qualify to take the New York State bar 
examination by submitting to the New York State Board of Law Examiners 
satisfactory proof that the applicant attended and was graduated with a first degree in 
law from a law school or law schools which at all times during the period of applicant's 
attendance was or were approved. b) Approved law school dPfined. An approved law 
school for purposes of these rules is one: ... (2) which is approved by the American Bar 
Association.") 
127. U.S. Dept. of Education. 
http://www2.ed.gov/students/prep/college/diplomamills/accreditation.html. 
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agency helps "to ensure [that] students receive a quality 
education and get what they pay for." 128 One method of 
ensuring quality in education, as was previously discussed in 
this article, is to preserve students' freedom of expression and 
allow them to be fully exposed to the marketplace of ideas. 129 
Accreditation organizations such as the Accrediting Council on 
Education in Journalism and Mass Communications or the 
Middle States Commission on Higher Education recognize the 
educative value of free expression and require their accredited 
schools to respect their students' expressiVe rights. 130 
Consequently, for a public university to receive the 
accreditation that it desires, it is critical that it give the 
appearance of preserving the freedom of speech and refraining 
from speech adoption and censorship. 
In addition to accreditation, universities will attract 
students through the positive press that they receive-and, of 
course, by avoiding negative press. In this area, independent 
watchdog groups can have a large effect on a university's 
appearance. Possibly the most influential of free speech 
watchdogs at public universities, the Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education persistently works to expose abuses of free 
expression in public universities. Annually, the Foundation 
publishes a Speech Code Report to "explore the extent to which 
schools are meeting their legal and moral obligations to uphold 
students' ... rights to freedom of speech, freedom of expression, 
128. ld. 
129. See supra Part I. 
130. MmDLE STATES COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF 
EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: ELJGIBILJTY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS FOR 
ACCREDITATION 21 (2006), available at 
http://www.msche.org/publications/CHX06_Aug08080728132708.pdf ("Academic 
freedom, intellectual freedom and freedom of expression are central to the academic 
enterprise. These special privileges, characteristic of the academic environment, should 
be extended to all members of the institution's community (i.e. full-time faculty, 
adjunct, visiting or part time faculty. staff, students instructed on the campus, and 
those students associated with the institution via distance learning programs). 
ACEJMC Accrediting Standards, 
http://www2.ku.edu/-acejmc/PROGRAM/STANDARDS.SHTML (last visited Jan. 23, 
2010) ("The Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass 
Communications requires that, irrespective of their particular specialization, all 
graduates should be aware of certain core values and competencies and be able to[ ] 
understand and apply the principles and laws of freedom of speech and press for the 
country in which the institution that invites ACEJMC is located, as well as receive 
instruction in and understand the range of systems of freedom of expression around the 
world, including the right to dissent, to monitor and criticize power, and to assemble 
and petition for redress of grievances;") 
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and private conscience." 131 Furthermore, the Foundation acts 
to publicize speech abuses as they occur, working to draw 
negative attention to violating institutions for any actions 
repugnant to free speech. 132 
In sum, although public universities have significant 
incentives to participate in speech adoption and censorship, 
some considerable interests may act as a counterbalance to 
those incentives and preserve many freedoms normally 
guaranteed to school-sponsored, student speech. 
CONCLUSION 
Few places exist where free speech is more important than 
in a nation's universities. Freedom of expression is essential to 
higher education because it is through the free and open 
exchange of ideas that universities meet their societal purpose 
of training individuals to become good citizens and public 
contributors. 
For this purpose, courts have actively worked to promote 
and protect student free speech in public universities. 
Consequently, students know that they do not surrender their 
First Amendment rights at the "schoolhouse gate"-they can 
meet and discuss topics and ideas without fear of repercussion. 
Students also know that when they benefit from government 
aid in producing and disseminating their expression, they can 
do so without fear of censorship based on their viewpoints. 
They understand that the government is more of a partner or 
an advocate in their learning than an opponent or a referee. 
However, in issuing its opinion in Summum v. Pleasant 
Grove, the Supreme Court may have changed that dynamic. 
Almost certainly, the Supreme Court did not explicitly take 
aim at public education when it issued that opinion. Summum 
specifically concerned the right of a city to include or exclude 
privately donated monuments on public property. During the 
case, the Court correctly held that a city, because of the 
government speech doctrine, does not have to accept, and place 
131. FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, SPOTLIGHT ON SPEECH 
CODES 2010: THE STATE OF FREE SPEECH ON OUR NATION's CAMPUSES, :3 (2010) 
available at 
https:/ /www. thefire.org/pu blic/pdfs/9aed 4643c95e93299724a3502Ma29d6. pdf. 
132. See, e.g., Leone! Sanchez, Free-speech Advocates Challenge Southwestern's 
Actions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 12, 2009 at B-3. 
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on public land, monuments from any private party after having 
accepted a monument from another private party. The 
government speech doctrine allows the city to say or not say 
what it pleases, without being compelled by any private party 
to say something different. 
Yet, in deciding Summum, the Supreme Court expanded 
the government speech doctrine beyond its previous 
understanding. Until that time, the government had to be the 
impetus or catalyst behind a form of expression in order to 
consider that expression government speech. Since Summum, 
the government may adopt private speech as long as the speech 
takes place in a nonpublic forum, is "sponsored" by the 
government, and the government exercises adequate control 
over that expression. 
This new adoption theory is particularly alarming when 
examined next to government-sponsored, student speech in 
public universities. Generally, the government may not 
encumber school-sponsored, student speech with any 
viewpoint-based restrictions. However, because government-
sponsored, student speech already occurs in a nonpublic forum 
(being restricted by a school's curriculum), and because the 
government, by definition, subsidizes government-sponsored, 
student speech, it appears that the government may adopt that 
speech by simply exerting control over it. Then, once the 
government has laid claim to that speech, there is no limit to 
how much or how often it may regulate or censor it. 
Furthermore, when the government is afforded carte blanche to 
censor speech, there is little to stop it from expanding its 
regulation of "free expression" when it has incentives to 
continue regulating. 
This Comment does not conclude that Summum was 
decided incorrectly. On the contrary, the Author believes that it 
was decided perfectly in its context. However, as time unfolds, 
and the judiciary further explores Summum's application, it 
will be interesting to watch how government speech expands. 
Clearly, Summum's version of government speech will not 
immediately and completely erase a college student's right to 
free expression. On the contrary, this Comment has gone so far 
as to enumerate some of the reasons why, in spite of the 
availability of speech adoption, many public universities will 
choose to refrain from adopting and censoring government-
sponsored, student speech. Nevertheless, as it is currently 
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elucidated, Summum may be used by administrators at public 
universities to increase their oversight of student expression in 
areas that are subsidized by the government, opening a 
loophole to the abuse of students' First Amendment rights. 
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